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  • Why it's worth saving the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

    Why it's worth saving the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
    Feb 21 2026
    The 25th Winter Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should have been a moment of celebration and of reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive, cooperative, and indivisible security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it was anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions — the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media — as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since, the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).Another priority — to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) — envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several mini-lateralisms that have recently emerged — including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group — it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose, and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head ...
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    6 Min.
  • Pay-as-you-mediate: Iran, Ukraine and Donald Trump's board of peace

    Pay-as-you-mediate: Iran, Ukraine and Donald Trump's board of peace
    Feb 20 2026
    The inaugural meeting of Donald Trump’s board of peace in Washington on February 19 caps a busy week for US diplomacy — though not necessarily for the country’s professional diplomats, who have been largely excluded from the close-knit circle of the US president’s personal envoys: his former real-estate business partner Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner.Earlier in the week, Witkoff and Kushner attended two separate sets of negotiations in the Swiss city of Geneva. They first sat down for indirect talks with Iran, before then leading negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and eventually dashing back to Washington to attend the board of peace meeting.At best, Witkoff and Kushner have a mixed track record of diplomatic success. Kushner was a key mediator in the Abraham accords during Trump’s first term in office. Designed to normalise ties between Israel and other states across the Middle East, the accords have failed to create sustainable momentum for regional peace and stability.So far, only the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia — the most influential player in the Middle East by most measures — has not followed suit.Witkoff has been credited with playing a key role in mediating the January 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. He was also involved in the negotiations around the Gaza peace plan later that year, which, with endorsement from the UN security council, gave rise to Trump’s board of peace.Both men have also been at the centre of efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Witkoff has been involved from the start of Trump’s second term, with Kushner joining more recently at the end of 2025.Yet, neither Kushner’s addition to the team, nor a greater focus on a parallel track of negotiations between Washington and Moscow, focused on the mutual economic opportunities that peace between Russia and Ukraine would create, have brought the warring sides closer to a deal.Taken together, the outsized roles that Witkoff and Kushner are playing in US diplomacy — despite their limited success — expose a fundamental misunderstanding of what peace making involves. Peace deals are generally complex. To get one across the line requires mediators and support teams that are deeply knowledgeable about the conflict in which they are mediating and have a detailed understanding of how a plethora of issues can be resolved in a technical sense.Above all, mediators need to be aware of what has driven the parties to conflict and what might induce them to cooperate. While material incentives, such as the promise of economic development in exchange for peace, are important, warring parties often also have symbolic and psychological needs. These also need to be addressed to ensure the parties sign on the dotted line and will commit to peace in the long term.Having just two people with little prior experience of diplomacy and almost no expertise on either of the two conflicts they are currently mediating simultaneously is a recipe for failure. It is likely to lead to a deal being pushed that is simply unattainable in the short term because at least one party will not sign.And if a deal, against the odds, is agreed because of high pressure on one or both sides, it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term because at least one of the parties will probably defect from it, and violence will resume. This is particularly likely if a deal lacks sufficient guarantees and enforcement mechanisms, because this lowers the threshold for defection for parties who are not negotiating in good faith.It is easy to see how such calculations apply in the context of the war against Ukraine. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has repeatedly made it clear that the Kremlin’s demands — especially Ukrainian withdrawal from territory in the east it has so far successfully defended against Russia’s aggression — are not something he will agree to.Even if he did, such a deal would almost certainly be rejected in a referendum. It will be psychologically close to impossible for Ukraine and Ukrainians to accept the humiliation of giving up something they have not lost, to reward Moscow’s aggression, and to be sold down the river by Washington in pursuit of an economic side-deal with Russia.Similarly, it is easy to see that Russia is not negotiating in good faith. Moscow is presenting Kyiv with an ultimatum, while destroying as much as possible of the country — both to weaken Ukraine’s will to resist and to undermine its future recovery. Add to that Russian resistance to credible security guarantees, and the true intent of Russia’s negotiation strategy turns out to be not the achievement of sustainable peace, but preparation for the next war.If and when negotiations on Iran or Ukraine break down, or if and when the agreements they might achieve collapse, supporting frameworks will need to be in place ...
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    7 Min.
  • The five problems with Trump's latest Ukraine peace plan that will only prolong the war

    The five problems with Trump's latest Ukraine peace plan that will only prolong the war
    Feb 12 2026
    In a surprise announcement on February 10, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said that his administration was preparing to hold presidential elections in Ukraine before the middle of May. Alongside the elections, a referendum on a peace deal with Russia is also likely to be held.This is a dramatic shift in Zelensky’s stance: the president had long resisted elections under conditions of war despite the fact that his mandate ran out in 2024. One possible explanation for the turn-around is that US pressure on Ukraine is having some real effects now. A few days ago, Zelensky himself indicated as much, saying that his US counterpart, Donald Trump, was pushing for a negotiated end to the war by June.Trump’s timeline — probably with an eye towards mid-term elections in the US where the White House would like to present a Ukraine deal as another major foreign-policy success — is one thing. The feasibility of elections and even more so of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is quite another one. In fact, there are so many uncertainties about both that whatever plan Trump’s team around Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner has dreamed up will very likely unravel very quickly.The first problem is all about the logistics of the elections. Who will be eligible to vote and where, and who might monitor the elections to ensure that they are free and fair? Apart from the hundreds of thousands serving in the trenches defending Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, there are also 3.7 million internally displaced Ukrainians and almost 6 million refugees abroad. And then there are the approximately 5 million Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.Add to this the uncertainty over a Russian ceasefire to facilitate not only the conduct of the elections themselves but also of a free and fair election campaign, and the prospects of organising any vote, let alone one of such consequence for the country and its people, look worse than daunting. In addition, there is the near-certainty of large-scale Russian election interference, similar to what Moldova experienced during its presidential elections and European integration referendum in 2024, and again during parliamentary elections in 2025. Russian attempts to influence the outcomes of all of these votes in Moldova were shown to have clear limitations, but this will not deter Russia from trying again, and harder, in Ukraine.A second problem is the feasibility of any peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. At present, it is hard to imagine that the gaps between Russia and Ukraine can be bridged in a meaningful way that does not cross either side’s red lines — especially on territory and on security guarantees.And even if it were possible to find a form of words to which the Russian and Ukrainian presidents could both sign up, the third problem is the approval of any such deal in a referendum in Ukraine. Likely to be held on the same day as the presidential elections, a referendum would face all the same logistical pressures. What is more, the question of who would be eligible to cast their vote would be even more acute. How legal and legitimate would the result be if large numbers of eligible people were not able to participate? This will be a particularly challenging question for those Ukrainians who currently live under Russian occupation. Their fate would most likely be determined in a referendum in which they had no say.Nor is it clear what would happen if a majority of Ukrainians rejected the settlement put to them in the referendum. Would it mean a return to negotiations? Possibly. Or an immediate resumption of the war? Probably. A third option would be the continuation of a shaky ceasefire and the implementation of parts of any settlement beneficial to both sides, such as prisoner exchanges. As was the case with the ill-fated Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, a return to all-out war, however, would remain firmly in the cards.So far, Ukraine’s European partners have mostly been on the sidelines of negotiations. They may not be a direct party to the war, but they clearly have a stake in the peace terms that might now be hammered out between Moscow, Kyiv and Washington. The mostly European coalition of the willing is expected to play a key role in the implementation of American-backed security guarantees and to do the heavy lifting on Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. After more than 12 months of hostility from Washington towards Brussels, there is little trust left in the dependability of US backing for Ukraine. The fourth problem, therefore, is that European acquiescence to a US-imposed peace deal cannot anymore be taken for granted. This does not necessarily mean that a deal is impossible, but it will almost certainly be so without Europe having played a part in its negotiation. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, recently dispatched a senior diplomat to Moscow for talks in the Kremlin. And the country’s former permanent ...
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    8 Min.
  • Farcical peace talks continue in Abu Dhabi as Russia tries to bomb and freeze Ukraine into submission

    Farcical peace talks continue in Abu Dhabi as Russia tries to bomb and freeze Ukraine into submission
    Feb 5 2026
    Russia, Ukraine and the US have met for a second time in as many weeks to discuss a possible cessation of hostilities. The meeting got off to the same familiar and depressing start as the first one: on February 3, the night before the three sides gathered in Abu Dhabi, Russia launched a massive barrage of 521 drones and cruise missiles, once again targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv. And while the talks were in full swing, Russia followed up on its nighttime strikes by deploying cluster munitions against a market in Druzhkivka, one of the embattled cities in what remains of Ukraine’s fortress belt in the Donetsk region.This was clearly not the most auspicious start to talks aimed at stopping the fighting that has now lasted almost four years. Add to that the fact that the basic negotiating positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain as far apart as ever, and any hopes for an imminent breakthrough to peace in Ukraine quickly evaporate.The more technical discussions on military issues, including specifics of a ceasefire and how it would be monitored, appear to be generally more constructive. Apart from a prisoner exchange, however, no further agreement was reached. But even such small confidence-building steps are useful. And even where no deal is feasible for now, identifying likely issues and mapping solutions that are potentially acceptable to both Moscow and Kyiv is important preparatory work for a future settlement.Without a breakthrough on political issues, however, it does not get the conflict parties closer to a peace deal. These political issues remain centred on the question of territory. The Kremlin insists on the so-called “Anchorage formula” according to which Ukraine withdraws from those areas of Donetsk it still controls and Russia agrees to freezing the frontlines elsewhere.Kyiv has repeatedly made clear that this is unacceptable. US mediation efforts, to date, have been unable to break the resulting deadlock.The political impasse, however, clearly extends beyond territory. Without naming any specific blockages to a deal, Yury Ushakov, a key advisor to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, recently noted that there were other contested issues holding up agreement. Very likely among them are the security guarantees that Ukraine has been demanding to make sure that Russia will not renege on a settlement.These future security guarantees appear to have been agreed between Kyiv and its European and American partners. They involve a gradually escalating response to Russian ceasefire violations, ultimately leading to direct European and US military involvement.The Kremlin’s opposition to such an arrangement is hardly surprising. But it casts further doubt on how sincere Putin is about a durable peace agreement with Ukraine. In turn, it explains Kyiv’s reluctance to make any concessions, let alone those on the current scale of Russian demands.What complicates these discussions further is the fact that the US is linking the provision of security guarantees for Kyiv to Ukrainian concessions on territory along the lines of the Moscow-endorsed Anchorage formula.This might seem a sensible and fair compromise, but there are some obvious problems with it. First, it relies on the dependability of the US as an ultimate security backstop. But confidence, especially in Kyiv and other European capitals, in how dependable US pledges actually are, has been severely eroded during the first 12 months of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House.Second, Europe is moving painfully slowly to fill this confidence gap and the additional void left by the US decision to halt funding to Ukraine. The details of a €90 billion loan agreed in principle by EU leaders in December, have only just been finalised. It will take yet more time for money to be available and to be used, including for essential arms purchases for Kyiv.Doubts — as voiced by Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte — also persist about whether, even in the long term, Europe will be able to develop sufficient and sufficiently independent military capabilities outside the transatlantic alliance.As a result, there are few incentives for Kyiv to bow to US pressure and give up more territory to Russia in exchange for security guarantees that may not be as ironclad in reality as they appear on paper. Likewise, it makes little sense for Moscow to agree even to a hypothetical western security guarantee for Ukraine, which could thwart future Russian expansionism, in exchange for territory that the Kremlin remains confident it can take by force if necessary.Russia will feel further reassured in its assumption that it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiation table by developments in both Washington and Beijing. In the US capital, there is still no progress on a new sanctions bill which has been languishing in the US senate since last spring, and which was allegedly “greenlit”...
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    7 Min.
  • Talks to end the Ukraine war keep hitting the same wall

    Talks to end the Ukraine war keep hitting the same wall
    Jan 27 2026
    The first official and direct three-way talks between the United States, Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had been a rare sign of progress in an otherwise bleak start to the new year. But they ended without a breakthrough on January 24, with follow-up discussions before too long likely, but not certain. It is hardly surprising that a peace agreement continues to elude the negotiators and mediators.The fundamental disagreement between Moscow and Kyiv over the status of territory remains. Russia formally annexed four regions of Ukraine in September 2022 — in addition to the Crimean peninsula which it has occupied illegally since 2014 — but still does not fully control them after nearly four years of fighting. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears convinced that his troops will eventually be able to capture the remaining Kyiv-controlled parts of the Donetsk region — some 5,000 square kilometres — just as they have done with almost all of the neighbouring region of Luhansk. At the current rate of Russia’s military progress, this could easily take another year; so Mr Putin would likely prefer to get his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to withdraw his forces. Mr Zelenskyy rejects the idea of giving up any territory that Russia has not been able to take by force — not least because there is no guarantee that the Kremlin would stop there. Ukrainian public opinion is largely behind him on this. In addition, the Ukrainian president cannot simply give away territory on his own. The Ukrainian constitution requires that any such deal be approved in a referendum.More important still are strategic considerations. Those areas in the Donbas that Ukrainian forces still hold are part of the country’s best developed defensive lines, including several so-called fortress cities. Handing these over would leave Kyiv much more exposed in the future and give Moscow an improved staging ground for renewed offensives.This makes an agreement on post-war security guarantees all the more crucial for Ukraine. After meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, at the World Economic Forum in Davos just a day before the talks in Abu Dhabi, Mr Zelenskyy said that an agreement on security guarantees from the United States had been finalised. That may be so, but it has not been officially signed as yet, making any Ukrainian concessions even more risky.As a result of their respective calculations, neither side appears to be willing to budge.All of this should be fairly obvious to any mediator, and it is hard to see how the American team, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, can be blind to these facts.If they were hoping to apply pressure on either or both sides to make concessions, their strategy has not, for now, worked.Even in the chaotic foreign policy process of the current administration in the White House, it seems clear that American pressure on Russia is unlikely to be forthcoming in any meaningful way — and the Kremlin appears acutely aware of this.Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, made it very plain before the start of the trilateral discussions in Abu Dhabi on Friday that Russia’s demand for full control of the Donbas remained in place. Overnight, Russia then carried out another devastating strike against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is already teetering on the brink of collapse.In addition, Russia continues to frame its current ‘offer’ to freeze the frontlines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for full control of Donetsk as the “Anchorage formula”, a term the Kremlin uses to refer to the agreement that Mr Putin and Mr Trump apparently struck at their summit in Alaska last August. By couching its territorial demands in terms of the “Anchorage formula”, Moscow tries to establish a fait accompli that gives the impression of a properly negotiated deal, and crucially one agreed by the American president. It flatters the dealmaker in Mr Trump, presents a potentially significant win for Mr Putin, and casts Mr Zelenskyy in the light of the unreasonable spoiler if he rejects an ‘agreement’ he had no part in negotiating.These are not the signals of good-faith negotiations.After more than a year of so far fruitless efforts, Mr Trump’s team also still does not seem to understand that pressure on Kyiv alone is not going to get them, or anyone else, closer to a deal. US support remains important for Ukraine and gives Washington leverage over Mr Zelenskyy, but it is no longer the only game in town.Mr Zelenskyy’s European partners remain steadfast in their backing and are picking up their game, albeit only slowly. The fact that Europe stayed united and faced Mr Trump down over his threats to annex Greenland — if need be, by force — will also weigh positively in Mr Zelenskyy’s calculations. With an even deeper rupture in the transatlantic alliance avoided for now, Europe will be both less ...
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    7 Min.
  • Trump's performance at Davos underscored America's diminishing trustworthiness and dependability

    Trump's performance at Davos underscored America's diminishing trustworthiness and dependability
    Jan 26 2026
    The week that marked the first anniversary of Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term as US president was particularly turbulent, even by his standards and especially for the transatlantic alliance. If there was even a hint of Trump being capable of self-reflection, one could add that it was a rather embarrassing week for him — on at least three counts.First, after much bluster about Greenland, including hints that if push came to shove he would authorise a military operation to get his hands on territory of long-standing Nato ally Denmark, Trump made a first climb-down and ruled out the use of force in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday. He also dropped the threat of imposing tariffs on the eight European Nato members who dispatched a small number of military personnel to Greenland in a highly symbolic show of support.Second, and contrary to earlier pronouncements that the American security guarantee for Europe was conditional on allies’ financial contributions to Nato, he insisted that the US would always be there for its Nato allies. But, as is usually the case with Trump, it was one step forward, two steps back as he cast doubt on them reciprocating in an American hour of need.Worse still, in a subsequent interview with Fox News, he denigrated the sacrifices of allied servicemen and women in Afghanistan, prompting a chorus of justified outrage from across the alliance. After a phone call with the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, on Saturday, and an expression of concern in a message conveyed “through backchannels” from King Charles III, Trump changed his tune. He did not exactly apologise, but he used his TruthSocial platform to praise the bravery and sacrifices of British soldiers in Afghanistan. No other Nato ally has received even that acknowledgement yet.Third, by the end of the week we were also reminded that progress on one of Trump’s flagship projects — making peace between Russia and Ukraine — is as elusive as ever. The US president appeared to have had a constructive meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Davos. But a much-touted agreement on US security guarantees has not been officially signed yet. And no progress has been made either on a deal for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.Two rounds of talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Abu Dhabi over the weekend failed to produce any concrete results apart from an agreement to meet again the following weekend. While Trump’s mediators tried, unsuccessfully, to push Moscow and Kyiv to compromise over the future of Ukrainian territory claimed but not controlled by Russia, the Kremlin’s relentless air and ground campaigns continued unabated — to bomb Ukraine into submission now and increase the costs for its post-war reconstruction later.Contrary to how swiftly he threatened the imposition of tariffs on supposed allies for sending a few dozen soldiers to Greenland, Trump failed, yet again, to get tough on Putin. There is still no sign of a vote on a bipartisan sanctions bill which Trump allegedly greenlit in early January. The bill, in the making since the spring, aims to cripple Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine and “to provide sustainable levels of security assistance to Ukraine to provide a credible defensive and deterrent capability.”One could, therefore, argue that it was a bad week for Trump and a much better week for the rest of the western alliance. After all, Nato is still intact. Europe seems to have discovered more of a backbone and, perhaps more importantly, that pushing back against Trump is not futile. The US president has neither abandoned Zelensky nor walked away from mediating between Russia and Ukraine. And Trump might soon get distracted by plans for regime change in Cuba or Iran, preventing him from wreaking any more havoc in Europe.But such a view underestimates both the damage already done to relations with the US and that yet to come. Consider the issue of Greenland. Trump’s concession to renounce the use of force was, at best, only a partial climb-down. Throughout his speech, Trump reiterated several times that he still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland. And as it’s not at all clear what his framework deal actually entails, his closing comments on Greenland included an unambiguous warning to other Nato members that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.” There is already, it seems, some advance remembering happening in Trump’s renamed Department of War, which released its new national defence strategy on Friday night. According to the document, the Pentagon will provide Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.”On Nato, Trump’s ambivalence towards the ...
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    7 Min.
  • Europe's push-back over Greenland forced a Trump climb-down — for now.

    Europe's push-back over Greenland forced a Trump climb-down — for now.
    Jan 25 2026
    Even before marking the first anniversary of his return to the White House, United States President Donald Trump doubled down on his controversial and highly damaging bid to take over Greenland, warning on January 19 that being snubbed for the Nobel peace prize last year has made him no longer obliged to think “purely of peace”. Three days later, during a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Mr Trump backed down — somewhat — and ruled out the use of force in his pursuit of the world’s largest island. It was a climbdown of sorts, even perhaps mildly embarrassing for the US president, and not the first time that a combination of push-back from Congress and NATO allies together with an adverse market reaction made him change course. So, how did we get there and is this the end of the Greenland saga?Buoyed by what he clearly saw as a successful military operation in Venezuela and the subsequent apprehension of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, the US president seemed determined to annex Greenland — a move he has claimed is essential to US national security — no matter the consequences.And these consequences were beginning to look more serious than ever.A meeting of officials from the US, Denmark and Greenland on January 14 had failed to reach any breakthrough. The following day, several European countries deployed small contingents of their armed forces to Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO and EU member Denmark.The public message attached to this was that the Europeans were serious about their commitment to Arctic security — allegedly one of Mr Trump’s key concerns. But combined with combative rhetoric about Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination, Europe also sent a message to Mr Trump that he had crossed a line that could and would no longer be ignored.Europe’s tougher stance on Greenland’s future did not mean that war between the US and its erstwhile European NATO allies was imminent or that the end of the transatlantic alliance was nearing, although the latter suddenly seemed a much more realistic possibility. Trump’s initial response to this European escalation — as he must have perceived it —was threatening to impose an additional 10 per cent levy on all goods imported from the eight European countries that he saw as the main obstacle between him and his ambitions in Greenland. These new tariffs were to take effect on February 1, before an increase to 25 per cent in June.The European response, at least rhetorically, was swift and clear: Europe will not be blackmailed. Even Italy’s leader, Giorgia Meloni, who is relatively close to Mr Trump, said the tariffs “would be a mistake”.What it lacks in military heft, the European Union makes up in economic leverage, and in a potential trade war, the EU would definitely be a more formidable opponent for Mr Trump. It still has some €93 billion worth of tariffs on US goods at the ready which Brussels drew up in response to Mr Trump’s so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs last April.The EU took a pause on the implementation of these retaliatory tariffs when it managed to iron out a trade deal with the US last August. That six-month pause is running out on February 7. Unless there is a vote to extend the moratorium on their implementation, they will automatically come into force. This is an important consideration for both Brussels and Washington: it removes the threat of Mr Trump’s European allies, like Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, blocking their extension.An EU retaliation could quickly lead to an escalating tariff war. Given European dependence on the US for exports and imports of US-made weapons, Mr Trump, in all likelihood, has escalation dominance in a transatlantic trade war. This could then force the EU to deploy its ultimate trade weapon or the “big bazooka” — the so-called anti-coercion instrument.Initially devised to deal with China, the powerful but never-before-used instrument gives the European Commission powers in various areas, including restricting US access to EU public contracts, investment and even trade in services, one of the few areas where the US runs a surplus.Brussels might have had stronger cards in an economic war with the US, but if push came to shove, it would probably still have lost. But a win for Washington would also have come at a high cost for the US, never mind the irreparable damage to the West as we know it.So, given these likely and unpleasant outcomes, why was Europe pushing back so hard, and why now?First, it seemed clear that the strategy of flattering and placating Mr Trump had reached its use-by date. Europe is unlikely to be able to prevent a determined American president from taking Greenland, but it clearly also no longer wanted to pretend that these were just cultural misunderstandings among friends that could be magically fixed.Second, part of the European strategy was playing for time. Mr Trump is keen on ...
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    8 Min.
  • A privatised United Nations with a single shareholder

    A privatised United Nations with a single shareholder
    Jan 21 2026
    It is hard to believe that Donald Trump has only been back in the White House for a year. His accomplishments are many — but most of them are of questionable durability or benefit, including for the United States.Even his UN-endorsed 20-point ceasefire and transition plan for Gaza released on September 29, 2025, is now in danger of being subsumed in yet another grandiose fantasy of the American president: the so-called “board of peace” to be chaired by Trump.This group of international dignitaries was originally intended to oversee the work of a more technical committee, comprising technocrats responsible for the day-to-day recovery and rebuilding of Gaza. But the board of peace’s charter makes no mention of Gaza at all.Instead, its opening sentence declares that “durable peace requires pragmatic judgment, common-sense solutions, and the courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed”.To make this break with such an unseemly past, the board of peace proclaims itself to be “an international organization” to “secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict” and commits to conducting its operations “in accordance with international law”.To which the immediate reaction is that unilateralism is increasingly the hallmark of Trump’s second administration. Settling conflicts is the prerogative of the UN. And, over the past year, the US has shown itself to be unconcerned about international law.Membership of the board is by invitation from the chairman: Donald Trump — who has broad and flexible discretion on how long he will serve for and who will replace him when he does decide to go. Those invited can join for free for three years and buy themselves a permanent seat at the table for US$1 billion (£740 million) — in cash, payable in the first year.With Trump retaining significant power over the direction of the board and many of its decisions it is not clear what US$1 billion would exactly buy the permanent members of the board — except perhaps a chance to ingratiate themselves with Trump.There is no question that established institutions have often failed to achieve durable peace. Among such institutions, the UN has been a favourite target for Trump’s criticism and disdain, as evident in a recent directive to cease participating in and funding 31 UN organisations. Among them were the peace-building commission and the peace-building fund, as well as the office of the special representative for children in armed conflict.The deeper and more tragic irony in this is threefold. First, there is strong evidence that the UN is effective as peace builder, especially after civil war, and that UN peacekeeping does work to keep the peace.Second, there is no question that the UN does not always succeed in its efforts to achieve peace. But this is as much, if not more often, the fault of its member states. There’s a long history of UN member states blocking security council resolutions, providing only weak mandates or cutting short the duration of UN missions. They have also obstructed operations on the ground, as is evident in the protracted crisis in Sudan, where the UN endlessly debates human suffering but lacks most of the funds to alleviate it.Third, even though he is unlikely to ever admit it publicly, Trump by now has surely found out for himself that making peace is neither easy nor straightforward despite his claim to have solved eight conflicts.And the more so if the “pragmatic judgement” and “common-sense solutions” that the charter to his board of peace subscribe to end up being, as seems likely, little more than a thin disguise for highly transactional deals designed to prioritise profitable returns for an America-first agenda.Part of the reason why the UN has success as a peacemaker and peacebuilder is the fact that it is still seen as relatively legitimate. This is something that is unlikely to be immediately associated with Trump or his board of peace if it ever takes off.Such scepticism appears well founded, particularly considering that among the invitees to join the board is the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who is not particularly well known for his love of peace. Even Trump, on rare occasions, admittedly, seems to have come to this realisation. But it did not stop him from inviting Putin to join the board of peace.So, what to make of it all? Is it just another of Trump’s controversial initiatives that he hopes might eventually earn him the Nobel peace prize after all? Is it merely a money-making opportunity for Trump personally? Or is it designed for his political and corporate allies, who might benefit from projects implemented by his board of peace? Ultimately, it might be any of these.The real question needs to be about the consequences for the current system. What Trump is effectively proposing is to set up a corporate version of the UN, controlled and run by him. That he is capable of such a ...
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    7 Min.