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Navigating the Vortex

Navigating the Vortex

Von: Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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 We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.comLucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff Politik & Regierungen Ökonomie
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  • Why it's worth saving the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

    Why it's worth saving the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
    Feb 21 2026
    The 25th Winter Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should have been a moment of celebration and of reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive, cooperative, and indivisible security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it was anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions — the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media — as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since, the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).Another priority — to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) — envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several mini-lateralisms that have recently emerged — including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group — it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose, and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head ...
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    6 Min.
  • Pay-as-you-mediate: Iran, Ukraine and Donald Trump's board of peace

    Pay-as-you-mediate: Iran, Ukraine and Donald Trump's board of peace
    Feb 20 2026
    The inaugural meeting of Donald Trump’s board of peace in Washington on February 19 caps a busy week for US diplomacy — though not necessarily for the country’s professional diplomats, who have been largely excluded from the close-knit circle of the US president’s personal envoys: his former real-estate business partner Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner.Earlier in the week, Witkoff and Kushner attended two separate sets of negotiations in the Swiss city of Geneva. They first sat down for indirect talks with Iran, before then leading negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and eventually dashing back to Washington to attend the board of peace meeting.At best, Witkoff and Kushner have a mixed track record of diplomatic success. Kushner was a key mediator in the Abraham accords during Trump’s first term in office. Designed to normalise ties between Israel and other states across the Middle East, the accords have failed to create sustainable momentum for regional peace and stability.So far, only the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia — the most influential player in the Middle East by most measures — has not followed suit.Witkoff has been credited with playing a key role in mediating the January 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. He was also involved in the negotiations around the Gaza peace plan later that year, which, with endorsement from the UN security council, gave rise to Trump’s board of peace.Both men have also been at the centre of efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Witkoff has been involved from the start of Trump’s second term, with Kushner joining more recently at the end of 2025.Yet, neither Kushner’s addition to the team, nor a greater focus on a parallel track of negotiations between Washington and Moscow, focused on the mutual economic opportunities that peace between Russia and Ukraine would create, have brought the warring sides closer to a deal.Taken together, the outsized roles that Witkoff and Kushner are playing in US diplomacy — despite their limited success — expose a fundamental misunderstanding of what peace making involves. Peace deals are generally complex. To get one across the line requires mediators and support teams that are deeply knowledgeable about the conflict in which they are mediating and have a detailed understanding of how a plethora of issues can be resolved in a technical sense.Above all, mediators need to be aware of what has driven the parties to conflict and what might induce them to cooperate. While material incentives, such as the promise of economic development in exchange for peace, are important, warring parties often also have symbolic and psychological needs. These also need to be addressed to ensure the parties sign on the dotted line and will commit to peace in the long term.Having just two people with little prior experience of diplomacy and almost no expertise on either of the two conflicts they are currently mediating simultaneously is a recipe for failure. It is likely to lead to a deal being pushed that is simply unattainable in the short term because at least one party will not sign.And if a deal, against the odds, is agreed because of high pressure on one or both sides, it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term because at least one of the parties will probably defect from it, and violence will resume. This is particularly likely if a deal lacks sufficient guarantees and enforcement mechanisms, because this lowers the threshold for defection for parties who are not negotiating in good faith.It is easy to see how such calculations apply in the context of the war against Ukraine. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has repeatedly made it clear that the Kremlin’s demands — especially Ukrainian withdrawal from territory in the east it has so far successfully defended against Russia’s aggression — are not something he will agree to.Even if he did, such a deal would almost certainly be rejected in a referendum. It will be psychologically close to impossible for Ukraine and Ukrainians to accept the humiliation of giving up something they have not lost, to reward Moscow’s aggression, and to be sold down the river by Washington in pursuit of an economic side-deal with Russia.Similarly, it is easy to see that Russia is not negotiating in good faith. Moscow is presenting Kyiv with an ultimatum, while destroying as much as possible of the country — both to weaken Ukraine’s will to resist and to undermine its future recovery. Add to that Russian resistance to credible security guarantees, and the true intent of Russia’s negotiation strategy turns out to be not the achievement of sustainable peace, but preparation for the next war.If and when negotiations on Iran or Ukraine break down, or if and when the agreements they might achieve collapse, supporting frameworks will need to be in place ...
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    7 Min.
  • The five problems with Trump's latest Ukraine peace plan that will only prolong the war

    The five problems with Trump's latest Ukraine peace plan that will only prolong the war
    Feb 12 2026
    In a surprise announcement on February 10, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said that his administration was preparing to hold presidential elections in Ukraine before the middle of May. Alongside the elections, a referendum on a peace deal with Russia is also likely to be held.This is a dramatic shift in Zelensky’s stance: the president had long resisted elections under conditions of war despite the fact that his mandate ran out in 2024. One possible explanation for the turn-around is that US pressure on Ukraine is having some real effects now. A few days ago, Zelensky himself indicated as much, saying that his US counterpart, Donald Trump, was pushing for a negotiated end to the war by June.Trump’s timeline — probably with an eye towards mid-term elections in the US where the White House would like to present a Ukraine deal as another major foreign-policy success — is one thing. The feasibility of elections and even more so of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is quite another one. In fact, there are so many uncertainties about both that whatever plan Trump’s team around Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner has dreamed up will very likely unravel very quickly.The first problem is all about the logistics of the elections. Who will be eligible to vote and where, and who might monitor the elections to ensure that they are free and fair? Apart from the hundreds of thousands serving in the trenches defending Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, there are also 3.7 million internally displaced Ukrainians and almost 6 million refugees abroad. And then there are the approximately 5 million Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.Add to this the uncertainty over a Russian ceasefire to facilitate not only the conduct of the elections themselves but also of a free and fair election campaign, and the prospects of organising any vote, let alone one of such consequence for the country and its people, look worse than daunting. In addition, there is the near-certainty of large-scale Russian election interference, similar to what Moldova experienced during its presidential elections and European integration referendum in 2024, and again during parliamentary elections in 2025. Russian attempts to influence the outcomes of all of these votes in Moldova were shown to have clear limitations, but this will not deter Russia from trying again, and harder, in Ukraine.A second problem is the feasibility of any peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. At present, it is hard to imagine that the gaps between Russia and Ukraine can be bridged in a meaningful way that does not cross either side’s red lines — especially on territory and on security guarantees.And even if it were possible to find a form of words to which the Russian and Ukrainian presidents could both sign up, the third problem is the approval of any such deal in a referendum in Ukraine. Likely to be held on the same day as the presidential elections, a referendum would face all the same logistical pressures. What is more, the question of who would be eligible to cast their vote would be even more acute. How legal and legitimate would the result be if large numbers of eligible people were not able to participate? This will be a particularly challenging question for those Ukrainians who currently live under Russian occupation. Their fate would most likely be determined in a referendum in which they had no say.Nor is it clear what would happen if a majority of Ukrainians rejected the settlement put to them in the referendum. Would it mean a return to negotiations? Possibly. Or an immediate resumption of the war? Probably. A third option would be the continuation of a shaky ceasefire and the implementation of parts of any settlement beneficial to both sides, such as prisoner exchanges. As was the case with the ill-fated Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, a return to all-out war, however, would remain firmly in the cards.So far, Ukraine’s European partners have mostly been on the sidelines of negotiations. They may not be a direct party to the war, but they clearly have a stake in the peace terms that might now be hammered out between Moscow, Kyiv and Washington. The mostly European coalition of the willing is expected to play a key role in the implementation of American-backed security guarantees and to do the heavy lifting on Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. After more than 12 months of hostility from Washington towards Brussels, there is little trust left in the dependability of US backing for Ukraine. The fourth problem, therefore, is that European acquiescence to a US-imposed peace deal cannot anymore be taken for granted. This does not necessarily mean that a deal is impossible, but it will almost certainly be so without Europe having played a part in its negotiation. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, recently dispatched a senior diplomat to Moscow for talks in the Kremlin. And the country’s former permanent ...
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    8 Min.
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