Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

Docket: 4:17-cv-00029-EJM

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the fee amount and a de novo standard to determine if the correct legal standard was applied. The appellant challenged the award by arguing that attorneys miscalculated or misrepresented their fees and that attorneys generally misuse fees, but failed to identify any specific error in the district court’s analysis or point to an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court held that the appellant forfeited claims regarding the disclosure of litigation costs to taxpayers because they were vague, unsupported by legal authority, and untethered to applicable standards. Consequently, the fee award stands, and the appellant’s motions for miscellaneous relief are denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

Docket: 1:22-cv-01333-KES-CDB

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Philip Koch’s employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against California Water Service Company for failure to state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Applying de novo review and liberally construing the pleadings as a pro se litigant, the court held that Koch failed to allege sufficient factual matter to plausibly support a claim that the employer “regarded” him as having a disability, had a record of such a disability, or retaliated against him for protected activity. The court found that Koch’s allegations regarding the company’s general COVID-19 policy did not establish a cognizable legal theory or a causal link between any protected activity and an adverse action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)–(3) and 12203(a). Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and Koch’s claims are dismissed without prejudice to refile if he can plead facts meeting the plausibility standard established in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal* and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

Docket: 1:19-cv-01591-EPG

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments granting summary judgment to defendants on Jackson’s conspiracy and access-to-courts claims and granting judgment as a matter of law on his legal mail claim. The court applied de novo review to the summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law rulings, and abuse of discretion review to the decisions regarding preliminary injunctions, appointment of counsel, and motions in limine. Regarding the conspiracy claim, the court held that Jackson failed to state specific facts supporting the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds among defendants to open his legal mail outside his presence. On the access-to-courts claim, the court found that Jackson offered only conclusory statements and failed to demonstrate “actual harm” in the form of past or imminent official interference with his presentation of claims to the courts. For the legal mail claim, the court determined that even construing Jackson’s pro se filings liberally, he provided no evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to rule in his favor. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of Jackson’s motions for preliminary injunctions and appointment of counsel. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief because Jackson had funds to pay for photocopies and failed to show irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits regarding actual injury. Similarly, the court upheld the denial of counsel, finding that “exceptional circumstances” did not exist given Jackson’s demonstrated ability to articulate his claims pro se and the lack of likelihood of success. Finally, the affirmation included the district court’s grant of a motion in limine to exclude exhibits of opened envelopes, as Jackson failed to meet disclosure deadlines, prejudicing the defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). As a result of this decision, the judgment in favor of the defendants is final and binding, and no further relief is available to Jackson on these claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

The dc-circuit affirmed the appellant’s convictions and sentence after determining that while the government breached its Plea Agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence above the agreed-upon Guidelines range, the breach did not warrant reversal under plain error review. The court held that the government violated its commitment to cap allocution at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range (77 to 96 months) when it stated in its sentencing memorandum and during allocution that the appellant’s criminal history score “does not capture [the] totality of his criminal behavior” and referenced an alternative, higher Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. This conduct was found to transgress the agreed norm by introducing an implicit notion of an upward variance contrary to the plea terms. However, the court concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that this breach affected his sentence because the district court imposed its 115-month upward variance based on four specific reasons unrelated to the government’s improper advocacy: the appellant’s lengthy history of gun and drug violations making him a “de facto career offender,” the brandishing of a firearm supported by an excited utterance from a 9-1-1 caller, the abandonment of a loaded firearm near an elementary school, and possession of three different dangerous drugs. Additionally, the court found no procedural error in the district court’s fact-finding or its explanation for the sentence, ruling that the findings regarding brandishing were supported by evidence, the consideration of uncharged conduct was permissible, and the court provided specific reasons distinguishing the appellant from others in the same Guidelines range. Consequently, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying a motion to reopen based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard, requiring petitioners to demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was egregious and rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair, as well as substantial prejudice showing the outcome might have been affected. The court found no deficiency because the information alleged to be missing from the record was already presented by the petitioner during testimony. Regarding prejudice, the court held the BIA correctly applied the standard requiring a plausible claim for relief and that the BIA did not demand proof that relief would have been granted absent counsel’s error. Furthermore, the court upheld the BIA’s conclusion that changed country conditions rebutted fears of persecution based on religion and nationality, noting the Immigration Judge made an individualized determination rather than relying solely on State Department reports. The court also rejected the argument regarding humanitarian asylum because the issue was not raised in the motion to reopen and was therefore unexhausted. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied, the motion to stay removal is denied, and the temporary stay of removal previously entered under General Order 6.4(c) is lifted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

Docket: 2:25-cv-01220-SPL

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Kenda Sue Porter’s negligence and premises liability claims against The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, while vacating the dismissal of her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Applying a de novo standard of review to the motion to dismiss, the court held that under Arizona law, factual issues regarding breach and causation are generally questions for the jury once a duty is established. Because Porter was an invitee and undisputedly owed a duty, the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that she could not establish breach or causation; her allegations that the Church directed a rushed chair-removal process without adequate safeguards created sufficient factual disputes to survive dismissal. Regarding the emotional distress claim, while the court agreed the complaint failed to allege physical manifestation of distress under Arizona precedent, it vacated the dismissal because it was unclear whether amendment would be futile, thereby allowing Porter an opportunity to seek leave to amend on remand. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-16

The Ninth Circuit denied Damaris Raquel Ortiz Carbajal’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied a substantial evidence standard of review to the agency’s findings regarding nexus, persecution, and CAT eligibility. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court held that the record did not compel the conclusion that the gang members’ threats were motivated by a protected ground rather than financial gain. Citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and 1231(b)(3)(A), the panel found no nexus between the harm and the petitioner’s proposed particular social groups (such as “Salvadoran government informants” or “Salvadoran landowners”) or her alleged anti-gang political opinion. The court determined that the gang targeted the petitioner primarily to extort money related to her mother’s land, noting that criminal misconduct motivated by money does not qualify for immigration relief even if the victim belongs to a protected group. Furthermore, the record did not support the claim that the gang singled her out based on gender or that general country conditions regarding violence against women rose to the level of persecution. The court also declined to consider new particular social groups asserted for the first time in the appellate brief due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Regarding CAT relief, the court found the record did not compel a conclusion that the petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured upon return. Applying the standard from *Garcia-Milian v. Holder*, the panel determined that the two non-physical encounters with gang members did not constitute “extreme and prolonged cruel and inhuman treatment.” Additionally, the petitioner failed to provide evidence showing a particularized risk of torture higher than that faced by the average Salvadoran citizen or establishing a greater-than-fifty-percent chance of being tortured. As a practical consequence, the petition for review is denied, and the petitioner’s motion to stay removal pending appeal is also denied, leaving the agency’s order denying relief in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.