A battlefield setback in Mali sparks a much bigger question: what kind of power is Russia now, and what kind of power can it afford to be? Is it a superpower? No. Is it a great power? It depends what you mean. It certainly is not just the "gas station with nukes" of the cliche.

Putin’s language of “sovereign civilisation” recasts greatness as resistance rather than dominance, especially as Victory Day messaging leans on endurance. I argue Russia is a middle power that can pivot, triangulate and sometimes punch above its weight without shaping the world order.

That's no bad thing. Russia (and Putin) are not "failures" as some would suggest, even if they have by no means hit their grand, aspirational goals. Russia would be a lot happier if it accepted this status but for Putin and his Homo Sovieticus peers, alas, this is not enough - and that is what has lead us all to the present unhappy place.

The article I mentioned from The i Paper is here, and the Deutsche Welle video is here.

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Putin didn’t pick a battlefield hero to run Russia’s Defence Ministry. He picked Andrei Belousov, an economist with a planner’s instincts and a technocrat’s patience. Thats what the Kremlin thinks it needs most right now: a 'Quartermaster-in-Chief,' who wouldn't tangle with Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, but instead focus in procurement that works, production at scale, drones that reach units fast, and a defence industrial complex that can keep up with an ugly, grinding war economy.

He is satisfying Putin, the generals and society -- for now. But his legitimacy depends on results, he is boxed in by a team of deputies representing other factions and interests, and in many ways the real tests begin when the war ends.

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The fastest way to lose your grip on Russia is to reach for the word “war” every time a scary headline lands. The incentives are everywhere: politicians who want public backing for big defence spending, media outlets that live on attention, and all of us who share first and think later.

I look at two particular examples: the current fascination in the British press with the idea that Russia may launch an attack using long-range missiles, and a truly insane essay by Konstantin Malofeyev in his Tsargrad media outlet fantasising about a tactical nuclear strike to end the Ukraine war.

The British article is here, the Russian one here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

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