Russia now pays 1.65 million rubles — more than a year's average wage — for a single military contract. And recruitment just hit a three-year low.

So what happens when the Kremlin stops buying soldiers and starts taking them?

Everyone is watching for a Russian mobilization this October, straight after the State Duma elections. Almost all of the coverage treats it as a military question. We think that misses the more interesting one.

In this episode we argue that a new call-up has quietly become a fiscal instrument — a way out of a bidding war the treasury is losing. A contract soldier costs the state 1.65 million rubles before he does anything. A mobilized man costs a summons.

But the cost does not disappear. It moves onto the corporate sector, and from there into inflation.

We also look at who loses in every version of this story: Russia's arms factories, already short between 240,000 and 500,000 workers, competing for the same men as the front. The shortage is specific, not generic. Russia is not short of warm bodies. It is short of turners, CNC operators and design engineers.

We finish with the strongest counter-argument to our own thesis.

The full written analysis, with five charts
veritaseuropaea.eu — recruitment costs, wage data and sectoral labour gaps, every source linked.

Sources include Russian Finance Ministry expenditure data, Bank of Russia publications, Rosstat, SIPRI, Meduza, The Moscow Times and analysis by Janis Kluge at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

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Figures on Russian casualties and mobilization scale originate with Ukrainian and Western government sources with obvious interests. We label them as such throughout.